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LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS: SAFEGUARDS FOR WITNESSES:
JUDICIAL PROTECTION AGAINST ABUSIVE PRACTICES:

TRENDS IN JUDICIAL RELIEF FOR
LEGISLATIVE WITNESSES
As a conclusion to its decision, one court had this to say
concerning congressional committee investigations: 1
...we think it may not be amiss to say that, notwithstanding
the pronouncements of the committee chairman as to intended
fairness, the courts of the United States could not emulate the
committee's example and maintain even a semblance of fair and
dispassionate conduct of trials in criminal cases.
Despite the enjoyment by millions of spectators and auditors
of the exhibitions by television of the confusion and writhings
of widely known malefactors and criminals, when sharply questioned as to their nefarious activities, we are unable to give
judicial sanction, in the teeth of the Fifth Amendment, to the
employment by a committee of the United States Senate of
methods of examination of witnesses constituting a triple
threat: answer truly and you have given evidence leading to
your conviction for a violation of federal law; answer falsely
and you will be convicted of perjury; refuse to answer and you
will be found guilty of criminal contempt and punished by fine
and imprisonment. In our humble judgment, to place a person
not even on trial for a specified crime in such predicament is
not only not a manifestation of fair play, but is in direct violation of the Fifth Amendment to our national Constitution.

This evidence of concern on the part of the court is a possible answer to questions such as "Why do they [the courts]
intrude... ."2 They intrude because the legislature is not

omnipotent and the courts are not impotent in dealing with
the individual. It is no new phenomenon that they should do
so. True, the possibility of intrusion shrank steadily from
Kilbourn v. Thompson3 to Jurney v. McCracken.4 If it were

I

Aiuppa v. United States, 201 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1952).
Morgan, CongressionalInvestigations and Judicial Review, 37 CAL. L. REv.
556, 558 (1949).
3 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
2

4

294U.S. 125 (1935).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

true that power always breeds responsibility we should expect
grave and courteous treatment of witnesses from legislators,
for the courts relentlessly closed door after door to the witness after Kilbourn v. Thompson in 1880 through Jurney v.
McCracken in 1935.
But times change and man with them. Apparently power
may occasionally breed responsibility. Florid over-statement
may yield to sober conservatism when the critic is required
to sit in judgment. In 1924 Professor Frankfurter wrote
'Hands Off Investigations,"' but in 1953 Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote in United States v. Rumley: 6
...we would have to be that "blind" Court against which Mr.
Chief Justice Taft admonished in a famous passage, Child
Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37, that does not see what "(a)ll
others can see and understand" not to know that there is wide
concern, both in and out of Congress, over some aspects of the
exercise of the congressional power of investigation.

Now that the courts have established the power of the legislature to deal with its legitimate problems, they may be willing to establish some definite boundaries. Recent cases point
that way.
The proper constitutional functions of Congress must be
pursued with a minimum of interference. This, all concede.
Such judicial functions of Congress as the express powers of
impeachment and regulation of the conduct and qualifications
of its own members imply the power of investigation and of
compelling the attendance and testimony of witnesses.' The
express power of enacting legislation is the normal preoccupation of Congress. Intelligent legislating requires informed
legislators. A generous interpretation of this express power
concedes the power of investigation, upon which may be
superimposed a further implied power to compel the attend5 Frankfurter, Hands Off Investigations, 38 NEw REPUBLic 329 (May 29, 1924).
6 345 U.S. 41, 44 (1953).
7 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897); Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 613 (1929).
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ance and testimony of witnesses where consistent with other
express provisions of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 8
Political scientists and practical politicians, however, unite
in urging additional and wholly distinct functions on the legislature. They state that the legislature should "inform" and
"educate" the electorate. Woodrow Wilson urged that the
"informative" function is paramount in importance over that
of legislating.' Others are of like mind. Some call it the
"ventilating" function. Ethical restraints on the choice of
objects to be "ventilated" vary with the individual or group
toying with this interesting notion. Legislators avow that in
their committee they are holding "the greatest open court in
the Country," "the grand jury of America." It has been
stated openly that one purpose of the investigation may be to
drive the objects of the Committee's wrath from gainful employment. A committee may state, and has done so, that it
intends "to focus the spotlight of publicity" 10 upon the
activities of persons and groups under investigation. This
"spotlight focusing" may be carried out in regard to beliefs
and activities with which Congress has no express power to
deal. Persons may be summoned as witnesses for the primary
purpose of inducing them to commit perjury or contempt.
Thus can be fastened on them punishment which the legislator believes they deserve and will otherwise escape either
because their.misconduct is so remote as to be protected by
the Statute of Limitations or is actually in a field of purely
local jurisdiction and not amenable to the laws of the federal
government.
On a slightly higher plane have been avowed purposes of
inducing the public to accept existing laws or to be favorably
disposed toward new laws. In connection with one notable
recent investigation, it was repeatedly affirmed by the committee that it hoped to raise the moral standards of the public
8 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).
9

WooDRow WMsom, WiLsox CONRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT

10 H.R. RE. No. 2, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1939).

303 (1900).
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in its attitude toward gambling. It is not possible to dispute
that public opinion is moulded by such means. One interesting
example is observed in the law of defamation. Twenty years
ago a charge of "Communism" was defamatory only on proof
of special damage. In recent years it has become established
that it is defamatory per se." The courts have universally
recognized the change in public opinion toward such a charge,
a change effected almost entirely by legislative exposure. In
this are ominous implications. It is frequently true that the
choice of groups or supposed evil conditions which are to be
exposed and demeaned in the public eye, is not even made
by the entire legislature, but solely by day-to-day decisions
of a committee or even a single legislator. It is hardly tolerable that such decisions should be made by legislators motivated by personal considerations.
In the face of such vigorous employment of the legislative
investigation for informative, educational and ventilating
purposes, what has been the position of the courts? Have they
blandly upheld the power to compel testimony by assuming
an ultimate purpose is legislation? Unfortunately, motives of
investigations are conveniently intermingled. This has enabled the judiciary to avoid the responsibility of deciding
what to do should the question be squarely presented. To
date the courts have almost uniformly honored a presumption
of legislation. Significant progress will be made when they
begin to differentiate between investigation in aid of constitutional functions and investigation to advance informative
and educational functions. The power to compel the appearance and testimony of witnesses is merely implied, even in aid
of express powers." Informative functions; if at all legitimate,
are themselves merely implied. It is doubtful that the courts
are willing to recognize a power of compelling testimony in
aid of such a marginal function of Congress.
11
12

Mencher v. Chelsey, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947).
See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has never acknowledged that Congress
can legitimately pursue investigations for informative or educational purposes. It has repeatedly denounced intrusion into
private affairs. In Kilbourn v. Thompson it held invalid an
investigation into nefarious financial transactions, even
though an incidental result of them was the loss of United
States Treasury deposits. Many potential ramifications of
Jay Cook's operations were of concern to the federal government. Had the Court conceived of an informative purpose to
be served by such exposures it would not have dealt so severely with the supposed intrusion into private affairs. The decision in United States v. Rumely can hardly be reconciled
with a power of "educating" the public to be aware of propaganda devices. In Sinclair v. United States 3 the Court
gratuitously devoted three pages to reiterate that a witness
is entitled to be free from harassment, and left the door open
by holding Sinclair had not demonstrated that the investigation was not in aid of legislation. More specifically in McGrain v. Daugherty4 the Court acknowledged that, other
than legislation, there would be "no other action in the matter
which would be within the power of the Senate," and "the
only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the
investigation was to aid it in legislating." Relevant dictum is
also found in the recent case of United States v. Kleinman,
where it is stated:
It may be that a congressional committee does not even have

to have a legislative purpose but may conduct hearings solely
to inform the public. So far as I am aware, no court has ever
held that a congressional committee may compel the attendance
of witnesses without having a legislative purpose. But that
question I need not and do not decide in these cases.

Another Judge has flatly stated exposure is not a legislative
power. 16
13 279 U.S. 263, 291-94 (1929).
14 273 U.S. 135, 178, 180 (1927).
15 107 F. Supp. 407, 408 (D.D.C. 1953).
16 See dissenting opinion in Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 259 (D.C.
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
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It is not necessary to deny that Congress may utilize informative and educational hearings. When it does so, however, it should not possess the same coercive means of compelling witnesses to attend and testify. When individuals are
not called in good faith to furnish information, but because
they are the wrongdoers, when the individual is called not as
a witness but because he is an object of scorn and a sacrifice
to public titillation, when he is called and addressed directly
as "the defendant," then he ought to enjoy some of the substantial rights of a defendant, for the committee in modern
times has become an examining and often committing magistrate.
The chief of these rights undoubtedly is the right to be
represented and effectively advised by counsel. This single
improvement would be a considerable advance over the view
frequently exhibited, that the rights of a witness, especially
as to counsel, are such and no other than those the committee
says he has.
My subject requires me to concentrate on the scope of
judicial protection. This requires consideration of the procedural context of the issue, or in other words, how the question may arise in a judicial proceeding. We must bear in mind
that Congress has power to deal with contempt. Though
rather complete, this power has not been exercised by Congress since lurney v. McCiacken nearly twenty years ago.
Referral of difficult witnesses to the courts for criminal
prosecution, either on contempt or perjury charges, has been
employed exclusively and frequently.
A. Let us consider briefly the scope of judicial scrutiny
if Congress chooses to exercise its own power of coercing and
punishing difficult witnesses.
1. The fundamental power of Congress to deal with the
subject-matter will, of course, be reviewed. In Kilbourn v.
Thompson this issue was presented in the medium of a suit

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

for false arrest and imprisonment by a witness arrested by
the Sergeant at Arms. Habeas corpus would be more effective
from the standpoint of speedy relief, and was successfully
employed in Marshall v. Gordon."
2. The resolution will be reviewed not only to determine
its technical sufficiency, but to ascertain the scope of the inquiry power delegated to the committee. This enables the
court to establish criteria for judging the validity of subpoenas to produce as well as the validity of a given line of
questioning. While "pertinency" as a test of a given inquiry
is not imposed by any constitutional or statutory language,
it has been made clear that it is nevertheless a limitation on
the exercise by Congress of its inherent contempt powers. We
must bear in mind, however, that when the recalcitrant witness is called to the bar of either house and requested to
answer, "pertinency" is no longer judged by the scope of the
resolution establishing the committee but by the much wider
range of the full constitutional powers of Congress."8 For the
latter reason it is doubtful that judicial review could be made
to embrace questions of a quorum or technical qualifications
and appointment of committee members.
3. "Due process" concepts doubtless would be applied in
judicial review. When Congress chooses to exercise its own
contempt powers it cannot be doubted that a witness is entitled to notice, opportunity to defend, and representation by
counsel. Rights of confrontation and cross-examination seem
implicit in the necessity of an opportunity to defend. In the
absence of a completely effective immunity statute it seems
equally true that the courts would enforce the right of a witness to claim his privilege against self-incrimination.
B. When the case of the difficult witness is referred to
the courts for criminal prosecution of contempt or perjury, a
17 243 U.S. 521 (1917).
18 Barry v. United States.ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 613 (1929).
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broader scope of judicial review is possible. Let me first note
some of the more frequent and accepted points of judicial
scrutiny.
1. The basic power of Congress to deal with the subjectmatter will, of course, be a subject of review. Quorum questions may be relevant and subject to judicial scrutiny if it is
necessary to establish that the committee was a "competent
tribunal" as it is in the case of a perjury prosecution.1 9 In
contempt prosecutions, however, the question of a quorum
has been held irrelevant when first raised on appeal." It
remains to be seen whether this would be true if the witness
should raise the quorum question before a committee itself,
which the parties in the decided cases failed to do.
2. The privilege against self-incrimination has provided
the most sensational recent application. Though basically
nothing new has been developed, the exasperation of committee members indicates that they wish tests to be made in
the case of witnesses who claim the privilege "improperly."
As is well known, many legislators regard any claim of privilege as "improper." There may be relatively little legal
interest in the matter. Some scope for refinement may, however, exist in the case of a witness who refuses not only
to answer the question but to answer a further question,
whether or not a truthful answer to the second question would
incriminate him, or who claims the privilege simply because
he foresees that if he does not and puts his own sworn
denials in opposition to the statement of committee informants he will inevitably provoke a perjury prosecution. As the
privilege against self-incrimination is thoroughly developed
in legal discussion, it will be noted here only by reference to
the recent holding of the Third Circuit that no further "background" of incriminating possibilities need be shown by the
Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
United States v. Fleishman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950) ; Bryan v. United States, 339
U.S. 323 (1950).
19

20
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witness other than such possibilities of incrimination as can
be conjured up by "ingenious" legal argument. 2
3. The scope of the resolution will continue to be a very
significant subject of judicial scrutiny. It determines the
"materiality" of a question for purposes of perjury prosecution, and "pertinency" for purposes of a contempt prosecution. In addition, it limits the validity of a subpoena to
produce, which subpoena is invalid if even partially beyond
the scope of the resolution.22 "Pertinency" is a statutory requirement for a contempt conviction and must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt in each case.23
4. It may be noted that review of committee action may
come before the court also in criminal prosecutions not formally designated as perjury or contempt. For example, the
committee may "make" a case of gambling conspiracy and
call it to the attention of the prosecutor. Evidence seized by
the committee will be subject to the prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure if offered by the prosecution. Thus, in
Nelson v. United States24 the court held inadmissible records
taken from the defendant's home by committee investigators
after the defendant's "consent" was procured by threat of
prosecution for contempt. The court noted the frank prosecutive bias which motivates so much of current congressional
inquiry with the following words: 25
If there is anything to suggest that a congressional committee
hearing is less awesome than a police station or a district
attorney's Office, and should therefore be viewed differently, it
has escaped our notice. The similarity has become more apparent as the "investigative" activities of Congress have become
less distinguishable from the law enforcement activities of the
Executive....
22

United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438, 440 (3d Cir. 1952).
United States v. Patterson, 206 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1953).

23

Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953).

21

24

22 U.S.L. WEEK 2014 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 1953).

25

Ibid.
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The foregoing enumeration is on every prosecutor's checklist. Significant extensions of judicial scrutiny merit individual recognition. It will also be helpful to isolate, identify and
consider evidence that the Judiciary would be receptive to
suggestions for additional extensions of judicial scrutiny. The
congressional inquiry has not hesitated to plunge into fields
overlapping the Executive and the Judiciary, to visit all the
realities of conviction and punishment on individuals without
the substantial safeguards of criminal procedure, to "make"
cases for prosecution even if it means inducing and entrapping
the witness into the commission of cime, to call witnesses
because they are accused of wrongdoing, and with little
expectation that any information of value could be obtained
from the witness. Legislative ventures unauthorized by express powers and intruding into fields reserved to other
components of organized society make it imperative to bring
remedial thinking abreast of realities.
Speculative treatment necessarily characterizes consideration of this thesis. At once, therefore, it may be permissible
to attribute some such significance to a case like United States
v. DiCarlo," where it was held not improper for Congress to
authorize an inquiry into the extent to which local criminal
activities utilize interstate commerce. The investigation
necessarily delves into the extent and nature of local criminal
activity, even though Congress cannot regulate it per se.
Nevertheless, in pushing into this field the scope of protection
given the witness can be widened to include the protections
he enjoyed under law at the local level. Therefore, the court
held that witness could not be compelled to incriminate himself as to local offenses. In doing so the court was required to
distinguish Murdock v. United States,27 and did so on the
ground that the Murdock case was concerned solely with
matters subject to federal jurisdiction and that incidental dis26

27

102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
284 U.S. 141 (1931).
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closure of local offenses was not within the privilege. Perhaps
it is possible to generalize this holding that restraints on legislative inquiry vary in proportion to the distance from the
exercise of express powers.
Next in order of mention is an intriguing decision which
defies easy analysis, United States v. Kleinman.2 8 The defendants were reputed leaders in extensive gambling operations around Cleveland. They refused to answer questions
relating to their activities. No specific claim of self-incrimination was made. Refusal to answer was put on a general claim
of violation of constitutional rights if they were compelled to
testify in the presence of TV, newsreel cameras and other
distracting apparatus. They were acquitted of contempt after
a trial in which counsel for the committee candidly stated
that televising and extensive publicity was considered proper
to educate the public. As it is risky to choose any key quotation the opinion is given at length. The court said: 2
For many years, and for obvious reasons, the Congress,
instead of handling the matter itself, has referred cases of contumacious witnesses to the judiciary. It has done so in this
instance.
When the power of the court to punish is invoked, it necessarily follows in order properly to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, that the court must examine the entire
situation confronting the witness at the time he was called upon
to testify. Only thus can it be determined whether his refusal
was capricious and arbitrary and therefore a wilful, unjustified
obstruction of a legitimate function of the legislature or was a
justifiable disobedience of the legislative command.
The only reason for having a witness on the stand, either
before a committee of Congress or before a court, is to get a
thoughtful, calm, considered and, it is to be hoped, truthful
disclosure of facts. That is not always accomplished, even under
the best of circumstances. But at least the atmosphere of the
forum should lend itself to that end.
In the cases now to be decided, the stipulation of facts disdoses that there were, in close proximity to the witness, tele28

29

107 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1953).
Id. at 408.
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vision cameras, newsreel cameras, news photographers with
their concomitant flashbulbs, radio microphones, a large and
crowded hearing room with spectators standing along the walls,
etc. The obdurate stand taken by these two defendants must
be viewed in the context of all of these conditions. The concentration of all of these elements seems to me necessarily so to
disturb and distract any witness to the point that he might
say today something that next week he will realize was erroneous. And the mistake could get him in trouble all over again.
It is said that these defendants are hardened criminals who
were not and could not have been affected by the paraphernalia
and atmosphere to which they were exposed. That may be so,
but the court cannot take judicial notice that it is so. Moreover,
it cannot be said that for John, who is a good man, one rule
applies, but for Jack, who is not a good man, another rule
applies. Such reasoning is incompatible with our theory of
justice.
Under the circumstances clearly delineated here, the court
holds that the refusal of the defendants to testify was justified
and it is hereby adjudged that they are not guility.

One might be tempted to explain the decision as holding that
the contempt was not "wilful" because of the distracting
circumstances. This is questionable because "wilfulness" is
not an element of the offense which is committed by a witness
who actually appears and then refuses to answer questions."
Some aspect of due process seems a more likely explanation.
At all events the court decided the case in a way which tends
to establish an enforceable standard of decorum and temperate atmosphere in the committee-room. The extension of this
standard to condemn harassment and abuse from committee
members is not difficult to visualize.
It is indeed brash to suggest that the courts are willing to
stop indulging so-called "presumptions" that a congressional
inquiry contemplates the exercise of an express constitutional
function. One must go back to the sturdy old case of Kilbourn
v. Thompson to find an example of willingness to focus a
critical scrutiny on the real motives of the investigation. The
30 Josephson v. United States, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838
(1948).
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Kilbourn case is practically indefensible in its denial that any
constitutionally permissible legislation could result from the
investigation. Evaluated in the light of what it actually did,
the decision is revealed as one instance in which the Court
recognized the intent of an investigation to establish the personal guilt of individuals. A colorful analogy to the fictions
by which common law courts broadened their jurisdiction
shows the Court's frank recognition that an arbitrary presumption of good faith could become a sanctimonious fraud,
sanctioning unlimited prying into privileged personal matters.
It cannot be meaningless that the McGrain case cites Kilbourn v. Thompson as indicating the relief available should
the power to investigate be abused. In the Sinclair case the
Court rejected the contention of a non-legislative purpose,
but only because the witness had not adequately substantiated his contention. An ambiguous incident in a recent District of Columbia trial may indicate that legislators' motives
are not immune from scrutiny. Accused of perjury, the defendant's opening statement asserted that the question had
not been asked in good faith to get information, but solely
for the purpose of harassment. The defendant was acquitted."' Presumably the offer of proof is based on a view that a
question cannot be "material" if not asked in good faith.
Progress on this point obviously requires candid revision of
self-imposed limitations and presumptions in the light of open
and avowed congressional indulgence in educational, informative, ventilating and "high court" functions.
A different and more optimistic type of scrutiny as to
legislative motives gives evidence of vitality. This is in the
insistence on the presence of something analogous to probable
cause to justify legislative inquiry. So far this thought has
been discussed only in connection with objections to intrusion
on First Amendment rights. The thought seems to be that
First Amendment rights, while premium rights, must yield
31

United States v. J. H. Rosenbaum, Crim. No. 1722-51 (D.D.C., Nov. 1953).
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something to the necessity of legislation or constitutional

amendment. But a foundation must be established for a reasonable belief that at least a problem exists meriting the
attention of Congress. Thus in Rumely v. United States, 2
the court pointed out the realistic impingement on free speech
in requiring a publisher to divulge his subscription list, as
there was nothing to indicate any serious legitimate concern
of Congress with dissemination of political ideas through
pamphleteering. Judge Prettyman, speaking for the court,
felt that the resolution was invalid for want of power to deal
with the subject-matter. The Barsky case, in which Judge
Prettyman also wrote the opinion, had, however, rejected a
free speech objection to a subpoena requiring production of
records from a private propaganda organization. The Barsky
case was justified on the ground that there was adequate
preliminary data supplied to Congress to warrant belief in the
existence of a problem, even though a potential restriction of
speech was possible. This "preliminary data" requirement
has often been associated with the "clear and present danger"
test of Justice Holmes.8" Such an indefensible test was rejected, however, in the Barsky case.
An additional protection of First Amendment rights is also
indicated in the holding of United States v. Lattimore,34 that
a perjury indictment was invalid in so far as it attempted to
show the falsity of a witness's denials of beliefs "sympathetic"
to Communism. The holding is based on two grounds: (1)
flatly on the invalidity of an inquiry into beliefs; and (2) on
the practical ground of the objective impossibility of establishing such a charge. The latter ground emphasizes the
vagueness of "sympathetic" attitude. A perennial hope of
those interested in these problems is for the development of
some sort of interlocutory judicial relief for witnesses. Thus,
when the deposition of a witness is taken in connection with
32

197 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).

33
34

Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1928).
112 F. Supp. 507, 516 (D.D.C. 1953).
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litigation, he may object to certain questions and interrupt
the deposition hearing to get a ruling from the court on his
objection. This same protection is even available to witnesses
in many types of statutory court and commission hearings.
The remedies of injunction, prohibition and mandamus may
be used in some cases against executive proceedings. Motions
may be made to quash subpoenas as invalid or unreasonable
search or seizure. There appears little nourishment for the
hope of offering any analogous procedure to relieve the perplexity of a legislative witness. It is definitely out of the
question that the legislature or its committee should be enjoined from acting within their own sphere. If, however, unreasonable demands are made on individuals there seems no
reason to confer a celestial status on legislators. Thus injunctive relief against dragnet seizures of papers might be had
within limits. The possessor of papers might be enjoined from
surrendering them to the agent of the legislature,3 5 and if
judicial relief can be invoked before the seizure becomes fait
accompli, it would doubtless be possible to enjoin even the
agent of the legislature. 6
A valiant attempt has been made to establish some standards of certainty in resolutions. This attempt has relied on an
analogy between the resolution establishing a committee and
a criminal statute. The latter will be invalid if vague and
ambiguous. It is argued that if the resolution is so vague as
to permit inquiry into areas where Congress could not legislate then there is no standard by which to judge the pertinency of questions.3 7 The assumption seems to be that a
witness should be able to make an intelligent judgment on
the spot whether or not the question is pertinent. This has
the appeal of reason. Yet it is not consistent with other
aspects of the pertinency requirement. Whether or not a
35

Strawn v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 3 U.S.L. WEEK: 646 (D.D.C. 1936).
Hearst v. Black, 87 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
37 See dissenting opinion in Josephson v. United States, 165 F.2d 82, 93 (2d Cir.
1948).
36
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question is "pertinent" must indeed be proven by the prosecution. The proof, however, may legitimately consist of background information, perhaps even confidential data known
only to the committee at the time of asking the question.3"
It is not necessary that the witness know or be able to judge
on the spot what the background data is. He declines to
answer at his peril. As a practical matter, it is equally true
that the witness who decides to lie under oath has no way of
determining at that time whether his answer is "material" in
view of other testimony and proof heard by the tribunal but
not by the witness. It must be concluded that the witness has
no right to be sufficiently informed on the spot whether or not
the question is pertinent or material, as the case may be. He
risks his future blindfolded.
In this light it seems relatively unimportant that the
resolution is too vague to enable the witness to apply it as a
test to the pending question. The majority in the Josephson
case said the question of "certainty" in the resolution was not
reached because the witness in that case even refused to be
sworn and was therefore not called on to answer any specific
question. It must, however, be borne in mind that the Supreme
Court recently applied a rule of strict construction to a resolution in the Rumely case and thereby recognized the resolution as a restriction on "pertinency."
There has been an uncritical assumption that the legislature possesses the power to compel the appearance and testimony of witnesses if it has the power to inquire. The Kilbourn
case expressed some uncertainty about the power to compel
testimony, but in the McGrain case the Court dispelled any
doubt as to this power when the subject-matter indicates
legislation may result. The power to compel the appearance
and testimony of witnesses may be a question quite separable
from the power to inquire into the subject-matter. Judge
38

United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953).
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Edgerton dissenting in the Barsky case insisted that the two
questions are entirely separable and said: "
The court asks "How, except upon inquiry, would the Congress know whether the danger is clear and present?" The
context shows that this means "How, except upon congressional
inquiry . . .?" The answer is: through the Department of

Justice, whose duty it is, if clear and present danger can be
discovered, to enforce the law of 1940 which makes it a crime
to advocate overthrow of the government by force; through
the intelligence services; and through any new agency that
Congress may think it useful to create. As the House Committee's history shows, no dangerous propaganda that eludes other
agencies is likely to be discovered by a congressional inquiry.
But a congressional inquiry, however superfluous, to discover
whether there is clear and present danger, could be authorized
and could be conducted without violating the First Amendment. The premise that the government must have power to
protect itself by discovering whether it is in clear and present
danger of overthrow by violence is sound. But it does not support the conclusion that Congress may compel men to disclose
their personal opinions, to a committee and also to the world,
on topics ranging from communism, however remotely and
peaceably achieved, to the "American system of checks and
balances," the British Empire, and the Franco government of
Spain. Since the premise does not support this conclusion it has
nothing to do with this case. It justifies no punitive exposure.
It justifies a very different investigation from the one the House
Committee conducts. The investigation the Committee conducts is unsupported by any color of necessity. As the fact that
some taxation is necessary does not validate everything done in
the name of taxation, the fact that some investigation is necessary does not validate everything done in the name of investigation. So far from being necessary to the safety of the
government, the Committee's investigation weakens the government by effectively warning the unorthodox, some of whom
are conspicuous for ability and patriotism, to avoid government
service.

It is to be hoped that we will see a development by which
these conflicting interests will be accommodated to each
other.
Confessedly the evidence of drift in judicial attitudes consists largely of mere straws. To identify even minor currents
39 Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d at 259.

